

International Journal of Game Theory

A Publication of the Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna

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Physica-Verlag · Vienna

Volume 11

1982

ISSN 0020-7276

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A Publication of the Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna

Founded by Einar M. Lommerud

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Composed and printed by: „Journal Franz“ Arnulf Liebing GmbH + Co., Würzburg
Printed in Germany

© PHYSICA-VERLAG Ges.m.b.H., Seilerstätte 18, A-1010 Vienna/Austria
1982

ISSN 0020-7276

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